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The Putative Father's Parental
Rights: A Focus on "Family"
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the father of an illegitimate child was viewed by
the law as a virtual non-entity. Recently, however, putative fa-
thers1 have enjoyed a new standing as parents with enforceable
rights. This recognition of the putative parent has brought with it a
great deal of legislative and judicial activity which has attempted
to define precisely the boundaries of these newly recognized
rights.
Emerging as a part of this period of definition was the Supreme
Court's decision in Quilloin v. Walcott.2 This case considered the
putative father's parental rights in the context of adoption. The
primary contribution of Quilloin was that it established a bound-
ary, albeit a narrow boundary, beyond which the parental rights of
putative fathers will not extend. The basic theme of the Supreme
Court's analysis in Quilloin was that the extent of commitment to
the welfare of the child, as evidenced by the fulfillment of familial
roles, is a prime factor to be considered in determining the paren-
tal rights of putative fathers.
A. Background
Biologically, the natural father of an illegitimate child is a par-
ent in the same respect that the mother is, but the law for centu-
ries has refused to recognize him as such. In England from time
immemorial the law has viewed the illegitimate as a "child of no-
body, that is to say, as the child of no known body except its
mother."3 The basis for this common law disregard of the putative
1. A "putative father" is defined as "[tlhe alleged or reputed father of an illegiti-
mate child." BLAcKs LAw DICTIONARY 1402 (4th ed. 1951).
2. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
3. Re M, [1955] 2 All E. 911, 912.
PUTATIVE FATHER'S RIGHTS
father was the fact that his identity was often uncertain 4 and that
he was stereotyped as irresponsible and unconcerned about his
child.5
The right to adopt children, however, was unknown to the com-
mon law; it exists in the United States only by statute.6 In estab-
lishing this right of adoption, the various states generally followed
the English view of the putative father by requiring only the
mother's consent to the adoption.7 This English view was force-
fully articulated by the Oregon Legislature when it enacted the fol-
lowing statute: "The consent of the mother of the child is sufficient
... and for all purposes relating to the adoption of the child the
(putative) father of the child shall be disregarded just as if he were
dead."8 In the absence, moreover, of this authority to veto an
adoption by withholding consent, many states also dispensed with
the right to notice.9
In 1971, however, the United States Supreme Court broke away
from the common law tradition with its decision in Stanley v. 17li-
nois. 10 In Stanley, Joan and Peter Stanley had cohabited intermit-
tently for eighteen years without benefit of marriage. Three
children were born to the Stanleys during the course of their
union. Upon the death of Joan Stanley, the State of Illinois insti-
tuted dependency proceedings." Although there was no showing
that Peter Stanley was an unfit parent, the children became wards
of the state.12 The children were then placed with a court-ap-
pointed guardian.' 3 Peter Stanley appealed the trial court's deci-
sion to place the children with a guardian to the Illinois Supreme
4. Id. 1f, however, the father could be identified, English law gave him the obli-
gation to pay for the child's maintenance. Id.
5. Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Com-
plaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAm. L 231, 231 (1971).
6. In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 570, 331 N.E.2d 486, 487, 370
N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976).
7. E.g., CAL. Cirv. CODE § 224 (1954) (current version at CAi. CMv. CODE § 224
(West Supp. 1978)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908(2) (a) (1974) (current version
at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908(2) (a) (Supp. 1978)); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104
(Reissue 1974) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104 (Cum. Supp.
1978)); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. arL 46a, § 6(d) (Vernon 1969) (repealed ch. 543,
§ 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws (effective Jan. 1, 1974)); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.32.030(3) (1961) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.030(2)
(Supp. 1977)).
8. Ch. 710, § 8(1), 1957 Or. Laws (repealed ch. 640, § 6, 1975 Or. Laws).
9. Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 Mc. L. REV. 1581, 1584 (1972).
10. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
11. Id. at 646.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Court14 and then to the United States Supreme Court. He found
relief in that Court when it said:
[A] s a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on
his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and that,
by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose cus-
tody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.15
The Stanley decision was a dramatic break from previous case
law.16 Juxtaposed against centuries of non-recognition, this break
"inevitably carrie [d] the potential for altering drastically the legal
framework of the adoption process.' 7 In response to Stanley,
many states have changed their statutory adoption schemes to rec-
ognize at least a limited right in the putative father to veto the
adoption of his child.' 8
A major problem, however, faced by state legislatures in alter-
14. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970).
15. 405 U.S. at 649. The Court remanded Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Serv., 405
U.S. 1051 (1972), for reconsideration in light of Stanley. Rothstein involved
the adoption of an illegitimate child without notice to, and over the objection
of, the putative father. State v. Lutheran Social Serv., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 422, 178
N.W.2d 56, 57 (1970). The Wisconsin court stated that
the putative father of a child born out of wedlock does not have any
parental rights; and... that the failure of the Wisconsin statutes to
grant parental rights or notice of hearing to a putative father prior to
termination of parental rights does not constitute a violation of the
state or federal constitution.
Id. at 434, 178 N.W.2d at 63.
16. But see Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v.
Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115 (1973-1974): "Prior to
Stanley, at least three jurisdictions had been confronted with the putative
father's rights: Michigan.. ., California.. ., and Minnesota .... The courts
in each case granted the putative father the relief he sought, though a differ-
ent justification was found in each state." Id. at 122 n.40 (citing In re Mark T.,
8 Mich. App. 122,154 N.W.2d 27 (1967); In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d
91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954); In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965)).
17. Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to
the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REv. 517, 518 (1973).
18. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (West 1956) (current version at A=uZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (West Supp. 1978-1979)); CAL. CIrv. CODE § 224. (1954)
(current version at CAi. Crv. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1978)); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 908(2) (a) (1974) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 908(2) (a) (Supp. 1978)); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(1) (a) (West 1971) (cur-
rent version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(1) (a) (West Supp. 1979)); 1957 Mont
Laws, ch. 240, § 5 (current version at MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-205 (4 CuM.
Supp., pt.1, 1977)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104 (Reissue 1974) (current version at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104 (Cum. Supp. 1978)); TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. art. 46a,
§ 6(d) (Vernon 1969) (repealed ch. 543, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws (effective
Jan. 1, 1974)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.030(3) (1961) (current version at
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.030(2) (Supp. 1977)); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.84
(West 1957) (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.84 (West Supp. 1978-
1979)).
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ing the law was whether Stanley should be interpreted narrowly,
as applying to similar fact situations only, or whether it should be
interpreted broadly as giving parental rights of putative fathers the
full protection afforded all other classes of parents. 19 Generally,
the substance of the statutory changes reflects a rather narrow
view of Stanley,2 0 e.g., if something occurs 21 to eliminate or at least
lessen the uncertainty as to the identity of the putative father and
his interest in the child, then consent from that putative father will
be required.22 A change reflecting a broad view of Stanley, how-
ever, was made in Arizona law. This change apparently gave the
putative father and the mother absolute equality regarding the
right to veto the adoption of their illegitimate child.23
The issue of interpreting Stanley broadly or narrowly came
squarely before the Georgia Supreme Court in Quilloin v.
Walcott.24 The court held to a narrow view of Stanley in permit-
ting the adoption of the child over the objections of the putative
father and without a showing of his unfitness as a parent,2 5 and the
19. Comment, supra note 16, at 125.
20. A principle reason for viewing Stanley narrowly was articulated in In re
Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511
(1975):
To require the consent of fathers of children born out of wedlock...
would have the overall effect of denying homes to the homeless and
of depriving innocent children of the other blessings of adoption.
The cruel and undeserved out-of-wedlock stigma would continue its
visitations. At the very least, the worthy process of adoption would
be severely impeded.
Id. at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
21. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 20.15.040 (1975) (legitimation of the child); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-61(d) (West Supp. 1978) (regular contribution to the support
of the child); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West Supp. 1977) (acknowledgment of
parentage); HAw. Rsv. STAT. § 578-2(a) (1976) (adjudication of parentage by a
court, or demonstration of responsibility for and interest in the child's wel-
fare).
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(1) (b) (West Supp. 1977).
23. Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (West Supp. 1977) provides: "No adoption shall
be granted unless consent to adopt has been obtained and filed with the court
from the following. 1. From both natural parents, if living, except in the fol-
lowing cases .... " Deleted from a former version of Section 8-106(1) by SB.
1277, ch. 172, § 8-106 (A) (1) (d), 1976 Ariz. Sess. Laws, was an exception which
provided.
Consent is not necessary from a father who was not married to the
mother of the child both at the time of its conception and at the time
of its birth, unless the father under oath has acknowledged parent-
age in a document filed with the court or with the agency or division
at or prior to the time the petition is filed, or unless the parentage of
the father has been previously established by judicial proceedings.
Id. at 863.
24. 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), affid, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
25. The natural father contends that the Georgia statutes take away his
parental rights without due process of law. He relies on Stanley v.
1979]
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United States Supreme Court affirmed.26
B. Facts of Quilloin v. Walcott
Darrell Webster Quilloin was born the illegitimate child of
Ardell Williams and Leon Webster Quilloin in December, 1964.27
Since the mother and the putative father did not marry or other-
wise establish a home together,2 the child lived in the custody and
control of his mother.29 The putative father, however, showed only
a limited interest in the child. He consented to the entry of his
name on the child's birth certificate, provided support on an irregu-
lar basis, gave the child toys and gifts from time to time, and al-
lowed the child to visit with him on many occasions.3 0 At no time,
however, did he petition for legitimation 1 of the child prior to the
commencement of the adoption proceedings involved in this
case.
32
When the child was less than three years old, the mother mar-
ried Randall Walcott.33 Ten and one half years later, Randall
Walcott filed, with the consent of the mother, a petition for adop-
tion of the child. Notice of the adoption proceedings was served on
the putative father,34 and he responded with an application for a
writ of habeas corpus seeking visitation rights, a petition for legiti-
mation, and an objection to the adoption.35
The petitions for adoption, legitimation, and writ of habeas
corpus were consolidated for trial.36 At the trial, the court did not
Illinois .... In Stanley, the Supreme Court held an Illinois statutory
scheme unconstitutional which required a hearing and proof of unfit-
ness before the state could assume custody of a child of married or
divorced parents or unmarried mothers, yet required no such show-
ing before separating a child from an unwed father. In Stanley, the
father was a de facto member of the family unit, and the mother had
died. Either of these factual differences would be sufficient to dis-
tinguish Stanley from the case before us. We find that Stanley is not
controlling and that Code Ann. §§ 74-203 and 74-403(3) violate neither
equal protection nor due process.
Id. at 233-34, 232 S.E.2d at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
26. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
27. Id. at 247.
28. Id.
29. Id. From September 1967 until 1969, however, the child lived with his mater-
nal grandmother. Id. n.l.
30. Id. at 249 n.6, 251.
31. The legitimation of children by putative fathers was provided for in GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-103 (1973). For text of statute, see note 42 infra.
32. 434 U.S. at 249.
33. Id. at 247.
34. Id. at 250 n.7.
35. Id. at 250.
36. IML
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find the putative father to be an unfit parent.3 7 Nevertheless, the
court ruled that the putative father's petitions be denied in the
"best interests of the child" and that the adoption be granted.38
The putative father appealed the trial court's decision to the Geor-
gia Supreme Court39 and to the United States Supreme Court con-
tending that he was entitled to recognition of and preservation of
his parental rights absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent.
Both courts affirmed the trial court's ruling.
1. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
A. A Family Role Focus
The Quilloin conflict centered on a Georgia statutory adoption
scheme. These statutes provided, with certain exceptions, 40 that
no adoption could occur without the consent of the child's living
parents 41 Within this scheme, however, treatment of the putative
father was unique. Unless the putative father acted to legitimate
the child,42 he had no parental rights. 43 His consent was never es-
37. Id. at 251.
38. Id. at 252.
39. 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(2) (1973) provided:
Exemption where child abandoned or parental custody termi-
nated.-Consent of a parent shall not be required where a child has
been abandoned by such parent, or where such parent of a child can-
not be found after a diligent search has been made, or where such
parent is insane or otherwise incapacitated from giving such consent
and the court is of the opinion that the adoption is for the best inter-
est of the child, or where such parent has surrendered all of his or
her rights to said child to a licensed child-placing agency, or to a
court of competent jurisdiction for adoption, or to the Department of
Human Resources through its designated agents, or where such a
parent has had his or her parental rights terminated by order of a
juvenile or other court of competent jurisdiction, or where such par-
ent is dead. Where a decree has been entered by a superior court of
this State or any other court of competent jurisdiction of any other
State ordering a parent to support a child and such parent has wan-
tonly and wilfully failed to comply with the order for a period of 12
months or longer, the consent of such parent shall not be required
and the consent of the other parent alone shall suffice in any pro-
ceedings for adoption relative to such child.
41. Id. § 74-403(1) established the general rule that "no adoption shall be permit-
ted except with the written consent of the living parents of a child."
42. Id. § 74-103 provided in full
A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate
by petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence, set-
ting forth the name, age, and sex of such child, and also the name of
the mother; and if he desires the name changed, stating the new
name, and praying the legitimation of such child. Of this application
the mother, if alive, shall have notice. Upon such application,
presented and filed, the court may pass an order declaring said child
19791
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sential for the adoption of the child, nor was hs objection to the
adoption ever relevant.44
As applied to the particular facts of Quilloin, the Court ruled as
a matter of due process that this statutory scheme was proper.
"Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say
that the State was required in this situation to find anything more
than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, was in the 'best
interests of the child.' ,,4
The "best interests of the child" standard articulated by the
Court is no magic criterion for settling adoption disputes.4 6 In-
deed, such a standard lacks precise meaning or substance.4 7 In
Quilloin, it served as a mere general label for the family role poli-
cies that were applied to defeat Leon Quilloin's parental rights.48
These policies include (1) the preservation of an existing family
unit, and (2) the requirement that parental responsibility be un-
dertaken before parental rights can be asserted. The significance
of the Supreme Court's upholding a "best interests of the child"
test is that Stanley's much more stringent "parental unfitness"
standard49 was not absolute. Certainly, where the putative father
to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from the father in the
same manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and the name by which he
or she shall be known.
43. "[U] nless and until the child is legitimated, the mother is the only recognized
parent and is given exclusive authority to exercise all parental prerogatives,
§ 74-203." Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 249.
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973), which operated as an exception to the gen-
eral rule stated in Section 74-403(1), see note 41 supra, provided: "If the child
be illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice. Such consent,
however, shall not be required if the mother has surrendered all of her rights
to said child to a licensed child-placing agency, or to the Department of
Human Resources."
45. 434 U.S. at 255.
46. "We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended '(i)f a
State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family ... for the sole
reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest."' Id.
47. "In determining the issue of the child's welfare and best interests the court is
vested with broad discretionary powers." 2 C.J.S. Adoption ofPersons § 90, at
520 (1972).
48. "Under the circumstances of this case appellant's substantive rights were not
violated by application of a 'best interests of the child' standard." 434 U.S. at
254 (emphasis added). See also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821,826,356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (1976) (" [I]n ascertaining the child's best
interest, the court is guided by principles which reflect 'considered social
judgments in this society respecting the family and parenthood."').
49. The State's interest in caring for Stanley's children is de minimis if
Stanley is shown to be a fit father. [Illinois] insists on presuming
rather than proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more con-
venient to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause
that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing
when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.
[Vol. 58:610
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has fulfilled a substantial parental role, as was the case in Stanley,
the unfitness determination is essential. But when a man fills the
parental void left by a manifestly disinterested putative father, the
"parental unfitness" protection surrounding the biological relation-
ship can be regarded as waived in the "best interests of the child."
Although the due process ruling was very narrow in Quilloin, a
number of limitations on the newly created parental rights of puta-
tive fathers were manifested. The first limitation was that a puta-
tive father's failure to show a substantial interest in his child's
welfare and to employ methods provided by state law for solidi-
fying his parental rights, e.g., legitimation, will remove from him
the full constitutional protection afforded the parental rights of
other classes of parents.SO *Second, the parental rights of a demon-
strably disinterested putative father may be subordinated when in
conflict with the interests of an existing, recognized family unit of
which his child is a member.51 This subordination may occur even
without the Stanley procedural requirement of a judicial determi-
nation of parental unfitness.
Limiting the holding in Quilloin, however, is the uncertainty of
an unusual fact situation. Certainly, the determination of a child's
legal father is not typically postponed until the child is eleven
years old. Thus, the Quilloin time factor alone could have attrib-
uted a special, or even unique, significance to the lack of interest
shown by Leon Quilloin and to the family unit's existence. Indeed,
the Court considered itself constrained to limit Quilloin to the
facts of the case.52 A number of basic questions, therefore, re-
main,53 e.g., whether the Quilloin ruling is merely exceptional,
and whether the policies evidenced in the opinion are central to
405 U.S. at 657-58.
50. 434 U.S. at 254-55.
51. The Quilloin Court specified that parental rights are constitutionally pro-
tected. This protection, however, did not extend to Leon Quilloin:
[T]his is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or
sought, actual or legal custody of his child. Nor is this a case in which
the proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of par-
ents with whom the child had never before lived. Rather, the result
of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit
already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appel-
lant.
Id. at 255.
52. Id. at 254.
53. These questions, however, may soon be clarified by the United States
Supreme Court. Presently before the Supreme Court is a case with factual
circumstances similar to those in Quilloin. The pending case, Caban v. Mo-
hammed, cert. granted, 436 U.S. 903 (1978) (No. 77-6431), involved the objec-
tion of a putative father to the adoption of his children by their natural
mother and her new husband. In a lower court decision the adoption petition
was granted. This decision was affirmed by the New York appellate courts.
1979]
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the consideration of putative fathers' parental rights in all cases.
Thus, the Quilloin ruling adds little certainty to the boundaries of
putative fathers' parental rights.
B. Ramifications for Psychological Parenthood
Nevertheless, a broad significance may be found in the fact that
the Court recognized as the child's legal father the man who had
no biological relationship to the child. This subordination of the
biological father's parental rights can be seen as a tacit recognition
of a psychological parenthood theory. A '"psychological parent"
has been defined as54
one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, compan-
ionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs
for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs. The psychological par-
ent may be a biological.... adoptive, foster.., parent, or any other per-
son.
5 5
... [Flor the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth
are not the direct cause of his emotional attachment .... An absent bio-
logical parent will remain, or tend to become, a stranger.5 6
Central to the psychological relationship, moreover, is the child's
See In re Adoption of Denise C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208
(1977).
On November 6, 1978, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Caban
on whether the provisions of N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney 1977) vio-
lated due process and equal protection standards. Section 111 provides that
consent from the mother of an illegitimate child is a prerequisite to the adop-
tion of that child, whereas consent from that child's natural father is not
needed for the adoption to occur.
Counsel for the putative father argued that his client's interest was pre-
cisely the same as that of the father in Stanley who had raised his child and
thus greater than that of the natural father in Quilloin whose relationship
with his child was "wispy" at best. Moreover, appellant argued that section
111 impermissibly drew a line on the basis of sex-preferential treatment was
given to mothers of illegitimate children over putative fathers. 5 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2035 (1978).
Counsel for the adopting parents agreed that the illegitimates' mother re-
ceived preferential treatment over the putative father, but contended that
New York had the right to make such a distinction. The basis for this distinc-
tion was stated to be that in "the experience of mankind," the mother has
been the more dependable parent. Furthermore, the father is not in a pro-
tected class; therefore, the best interests of the child test is sufficient to pro-
tect his interests. Respondent also contended that, contrary to appellant's
assertion, there was no substance to the putative father's relationship with
the children. Id.
54. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CILD (1973).
55. Id. at 98. For the purposes of this casenote, however, the psychological rela-
tionship will include no biological ties.
56. Id. at 17.
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sense of being wanted, i.e., that he or she is an essential figure in
the parent's emotional life.57 Without such a perception the child
will not develop a proper self-appreciation or proper regard for
others.58
The United States Supreme Court considered the psychological
parenthood theory offered by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit in Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform59
(OFFER). In OFFER, the foster parents had relied to some extent
on the Goldstein, Freud and Solnit psychological parenthood the-
ory.6e In response to this reliance, the Supreme Court specified
that
this case turns not on the disputed validity of any particular psychological
theory, but on the legal consequences of the undisputed fact that the emo-
tional ties between foster parent and foster child are in many cases quite
close, and undoubtedly in some as close as those existing in biological
families.6 1
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to adopt the psychological
parenthood theory.62
OFFER involved a challenge by individual foster parents and a
foster parent organization against procedures used under New
York State and New York City law for removing foster children
from foster homes. This challenge involved a request for declara-
tory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.63 The district
court granted relief, declaring that the pre-removal procedures
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. Being wanted, however, is not always beneficial to the child:
To be wanted ceases to be beneficial to the degree that "wanting" the
child is not based on reciprocity of feelings and on recognition of the
child's own personal characteristics. The child is placed in jeopardy
whenever the adults' claim for him is based solely or predominantly
on motives such as the wish to gain some financial advantage to
score over a warring partner after divorce; to force a reluctant sexual
partner into marriage; to cement an insecure marital relationship; or
to replace a child lost by death.
To be wanted also ceases to be beneficial if the adults' need for
the child and valuation of him are excessive and if no or too little
return from his side is expected.
Id. at 21.
59. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
60. See Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
61. 431 U.S. at 845 n.52.
62. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, moreover, have been severely criticized for ig-
noring empirical research about parental deprivation which throws doubt on
their assumptions and for failing to assess the costs as well as the benefits of
their proposals. See Katkin, Bullington & Levine, Above and Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child: An Inquiry Into the Relationship Between Social Sci-
ence and Social Action, 8 LAw & Soc'y REv. 669 (1974). See also Strauss &
Strauss, Book Review, 74 CoLumL L. REv. 996 (1974).
63. (1976).
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were defective.64 The United States Supreme Court, however, re-
versed.65 The Supreme Court did not decide whether the foster
family psychological relationship constituted a due process liberty
interest. Rather, it ruled that, even assuming such an interest did
exist in the foster relationship, the procedures used were adequate
to protect that interest.
In spite of the fact that the foster parents were frustrated in
OFFER, dicta in that opinion indicates that the Court is inclined to
recognize a liberty interest in psychological parent-child relation-
ships.66 The OFFER opinion quoted the statement from Prince v.
Massachusetts67 that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder.' '68 With reference to this statement
in Prince, the Court in OFFER specified that "[t]he scope of these
rights extends beyond natural parents. ''69 Moreover, the OFFER
Court recognized a basic principle from the psychological
parenthood theory that the concept of family relationships, to
which constitutional rights attach, is not limited to biological ties:
[T]he usual understanding of "family" implies biological relationships,
and most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have
stressed this element ...
... But biological relationships are not exclusive determination of the
existence of a family...
*. . [T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals in-
volved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that de-
rive from the intimacy of daily association... as well as from the fact of
blood relationship. 70
64. In Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277,282 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), however, the district court refused to recog-
nize a liberty interest in psychological parent-child relationships, stating that
"[w]e need not and should not ... reach out to decide such novel questions
when narrower grounds exist to support our decision." Id. at 282.
65. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
66. Three justices, however, in a concurring opinion, stated specifically that the
foster parents in OFFER had no liberty interest in their psychological family
relationships:
In these circumstances, I cannot understand why the Court thinks
itself obliged to decide these cases on the assumption that either fos-
ter parents or foster children in New York have some sort of "liberty"
interest in the continuation of their relationship. Rather than tiptoe-
ing around this central issue, I would squarely hold that the interests
asserted by the appellees are not of a kind that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects.
431 U.S. at 857-58 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
68. Id. at 166.
69. 431 U.S. at 843 nA9.
70. Id. at 843.
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Thus, the United States Supreme Court has articulated a theoreti-
cal basis for recognizing a liberty interest in the psychological par-
ent-child relationship which falls under the protection of the
fourteenth amendment.
In light of this theoretical basis, Quilloin takes on special
significance. The Quilloin Court recognized that biological parents
have a constitutionally protected interest in their children. Never-
theless, the Court subordinated the biological father's rights to
those of the psycholgical father.7 1 This subordination may be seen
as a recognition by the United States Supreme Court of a liberty
interest in the psychological parent-child relationship 7 2
Assuming that such a liberty interest was recognized by
Quilloin, the question arises as to when that interest vests in the
psychological relationship. Quilloin clearly indicated that it could
not vest until the rights of the competing biological relationship
had diminished: "We have recognized on numerous occasions that
the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally pro-
tected .... But this is not a case in which the unwed father at any
time had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child."73 A simi-
lar indication was given by the OFFER Court. In OFFER the natu-
ral parents, like Leon Quilloin, had failed to establish a
relationship with their children and a psychological parent-child
relationship had arisen in the foster family. Thus, the rights of the
natural parents appeared to be diminished. The Court indicated,
however, that the natural parents continued to have legal rights in
the child that would possibly preclude the vesting of a liberty in-
terest in the psychological relationship.7 4 These legal rights were
based upon the facts that the state, an essential partner in the fos-
ter relationship, recognized a legal interest in the natural parents
and that the natural parents had initially given up the child only on
the express contractual understanding that the child would be re-
turned upon the occurrence of specific conditions.7 5
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit also recognized that the mere exist-
ence of a psychological relationship does not necessarily vest in
71. The fact, however, that the child's natural mother was a member of the
Quilloin protected family unit was certainly not an unimportant factor in de-
feating Leon Quilloin's parental rights. It should be noted in contrast that in
Stanley the natural mother was not alive to assert her rights against the pu-
tative father whose rights withstood all other challenges.
72. Granted, Quilloin involved the biological parent asserting his rights, rather
than the psychological parent as in OFFER. Moreover, the psychological par-
ent in Quilloin did not ask that a psychological right be recognized. Never-
theless, the Quilloin Court articulated its reasoning in terms of protecting an
existing family unit of which a psychological parent was a member.
73. 434 U.S. at 255.
74. 431 U.S. at 845-47.
75. Id.
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that relationship a right superior to that of the biological relation-
ship:
The process through which a new child-parent status emerges is too com-
plex and subject to too many individual variations for the law to provide a
rigid statutory timetable. For the purposes of declaring a child eligible for
adoption or of acknowledging the existence of a common-law adoptive re-
lationship, 761 abandonment in law would have taken place by the time
the parents' absence has caused the child to feel no longer wanted by
them. It would be that time when the child, having felt helpless and aban-
doned, has reached out to establish a new relationship with an adult who
is to become or has become his psychological parent.
7
A liberty interest recognized in psychological relationships,
therefore, can only be a limited one, subject to the rights of biologi-
cal parents who have fulfilled a parental role. Thus, such a recog-
nition, though certainly an expansion of traditional law, is not a
radical departure from the basic concepts of family law:
"[R] ejected is the notion.., that third-party custodians may ac-
quire some sort of squatter's rights in another's child. Third-party
custodians acquire 'rights'. . . only after, as the cases have always
held, the parent's rights and responsibilities have been dis-
placed."78
III EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A. A Family Role Focus
In Quilloin, the Supreme Court indicated that a substantial dif-
ference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the illegiti-
mate child, as evidenced by the fulfillment of familial roles, is a
sufficient constitutional basis for granting greater parental rights
to one parent than to another.7 9 Leon Quilloin had argued that his
parental rights were indistinguishable from those of any married
father and particularly from those of a divorced father. The Court,
however, disagreed and ruled that the state could permissively
give Leon Quilloin less veto authority than it providedia married or
divorced father. The basis for this distinction was the fact that
Quilloin had never "shouldered any significant responsibility [ac-
76. The term "common-law adoptive parent" is not currently in use in
law. We use the term to designate those psychological parent-child
relationships which develop outside of either placement by formal
adoption or by the initial assignment of a child to his biological par-
ents. Such relationships may develop when a parent, without resort
to any legal process, leaves his or her child with a friend or relative
for an extended period of time.
J. GoLDsTEiN, A. FREuD & A. SoLNrr, supra note 54, at 27.
77. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
78. Bennett v. Jeifreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821, 829 n.2 (1976).
79. 434 U.S. at 256.
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tual or legal] with respect to the daily supervision, education, pro-
tection, or care of the child,"80 whereas even a divorced father will
have at least borne full legal responsibility for the rearing of his
children during the period of the marriage. The Court specified
that "[uinder any standard of review, the State was not foreclosed
from recognizing this difference ....
A corollary to this equal protection ruling is found in Mathews
v. Lucas.8 2 Mathews considered the constitutionality of the Social
Security Act provision allowing dependent children to receive ben-
efits upon the death of a parent.8 3 Under this Act, legitimate and
legitimated84 children were presumed dependent. Illegitimate
children, on the other hand, could receive benefits only upon the
demonstration of a significant indication of the likelihood of actual
dependency. This statutory scheme was upheld.85 Thus, the lack
of family relationships between the father and his illegitimate
child was a sufficient justification for denying the children rights in
their putative father. It does not seem entirely unreasonable,
therefore, for the same lack of familial relationships to be adequate
justification for denying the putative father rights in his illegiti-
mate children, regardless of the rights possessed by other classes
of parents.
Other cases also demonstrate a family focus in the law regard-
ing illegitimates. In Levy v. Louisiana,8 6 for example, illegitimate
children sought recovery for the wrongful death of their mother.
The Court granted recovery, stating that the children "were indeed
hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they
suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would. We con-
clude that it is invidious to discriminate against them .... ,,87
Another example is found in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 8 8 Weber involved legitimate children (the man's by a prior
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
83. Id. at 497.
84. For factors that qualify a child as legitimated, see 427 U.S. at 499.
85. Id. at 516.
86. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
87. Id. at 72.
[Tlhe mother.., gave birth to these five illegitimate children and
... they lived with her; ... she treated them as a parent would treat
any other child,... she worked as a domestic servant to support
them, taking them to church every Sunday and enrolling them, at her
own expense, in a parochial school
.... The rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial rela-
tionship between a child and his own mother.
Id. at 70-71.
88. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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marriage) and illegitimate children living in the same household
with parents who were not married to each other. When the man
died, the legitimate children received workmen's compensation
benefits from his death, but the illegitimate children received no
such benefits. The Court held that the illegitimate children were
also entitled to receive benefits because their affinity for and de-
pendence upon their putative father was as great as that of the le-
gitimate children.89
In Stanley, moreover, the Court emphasized that Stanley's con-
stitutionally protected interest was "in the children he has sired
[illegitimately] and raised."90 Without the family role distinction
between Stanley and Quilloin, the two cases would be difficult to
reconcile. 91 Thus, the family focus is and has been an essential
factor in determining parental rights in illegitimate children.
B. Implications For Sex Discrimination
Although the Supreme Court in Quilloin did not see fit to dis-
cuss the issue of sex discrimination,92 the Quilloin ruling allowed
a statutory scheme to stand which appears to discriminate against
men: "The mother of an illegitimate child shall be entitled to the
possession of the child, unless the father shall legitimate him ....
Being the only recognized parent, she may exercise all the pater-
nal [sic] power."93 Thus, the Court implicitly established putative
fathers as a special class of parents that may be treated differently
under certain circumstances from mothers of illegitimate children.
The family role policy specified in Quilloin for treating putative
fathers differently than married fathers involved a difference in
past relationships between the parent and child. This policy
seems to be much more appropriate when applied to mothers of
illegitimate children than to divorced fathers.94 The mother, dur-
89. Id. at 169-70.
90. 405 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added).
91. Stanley required a determination of the putative father's unfitness before ter-
minating his parental rights; whereas, Quilloin dispensed with that prerequi-
site.
92. Although appellant's brief stated that "[t)he challenged Georgia statutes are
... gender based distinctions and ... are out of touch with the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," Brief for Appellant at 23, the
Court brushed aside the sex discrimination issue on the technicality that it
was not specifically included in the jurisdictional statement. 434 U.S. at 253
n.13.
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1973). The Georgia Supreme Court indicated that
the word "paternal" in this section is the result of a misprint, and was instead
intended to read "parental" See Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 231, 232
S.E.2d 246, 247 (1977).
94. It is not difficult to conceive of a fact situation in which the divorced father's
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ing the period of pregnancy, bears actual responsibility with re-
spect to the daily supervision, protection, and care of the child in a
very thorough sense. Indeed, she shoulders actual responsibility
during pregnancy to an extent at least equal to that of any divorced
father. The United States Supreme Court, moreover, has deter-
mined that the ultimate legal authority over the child during preg-
nancy resides in the mother alone.95 Thus, the mother's parental
rights at the child's birth are deserving of the highest constitu-
tional protection.
The putative fathers' parental rights, on the other hand, do not
arise in such a spontaneous manner. To protect his rights in most
states the putative father must utilize statutory procedures for es-
tablishing his parental rights in his child96 (this may be accom-
plished even before the child's birth) or demonstrate in a variety of
non-legal ways a substantial commitment to the child's welfare.97
The absence of such affirmative action places his parental rights in
a position inferior to those of the mother under state law at the
birth of the child.98 Thus, the Supreme Court in Quilloin v.
Walcott has established a basis for allowing in certain circum-
relationship, both actual and legal, to his legitimate child is quite attenuated.
Differing standards of review do not foreclose such a comparison because
Quilloin specified that "[u] nder any standard of review," 434 U.S. at 256, this
policy was significant.
95. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court held that a
state may not give a man the legal authority to veto his wife's decision to
abort her child. In determining whose consent was necessary to authorize
the abortion, a primary difficulty apparently involved the relevance of a mar-
riage relationship. The Court devoted a significant portion of its opinion to
this factor. Thus, in the context of illegitimacy, this factor is totally irrelevant
and the woman's legal authority over the unborn child is even stronger than
that of the woman in Danforth.
96. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 20.15.040 (1975) (legitimation of the child); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN § 45-61(d) (West Supp. 1978) (regular contribution to the sup-
port of the child); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West Supp. 1977) (acknowledg-
ment of parentage); HAw. Rav. STAT. § 578-2(a) (1976) (adjudication of
parentage by a court, or demonstration of responsibility for an interest in the
child's welfare).
97. The Quilloin case gives an example of a commitment that is not sufficient.
98. Quilloin suggested, however, that a failure to utilize statutory procedures
over a period of time for protecting parental rights could be sufficient in itself
(even if a substantial interest in the child's welfare had been demonstrated)
to defeat a putative father's parental rights. The Court stated that "[w]e
would hesitate to rest decision on this ground [i.e., that Leon Quilloin did not
petition for legitimation until the child was nearly twelve years old] .... But
in any event we need not go that far ...." 434 U.S. at 254. The primary rea-
son given for this hesitancy was 'that appellant was not aware of the legiti-
mation procedure until after the adoption petition was filed." Id. Thus,
although the decision did not turn on Leon Quilloin's failure to act, the Court
clearly indicated that such a failure placed his parental rights in jeopardy.
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stances a mother to have parental rights to an illegitimate child
superior to those of the child's father.
IV. CONCLUSION
The articulated rationale for the Quilloin holding was rather
abrupt. Rather than discussing at length the theoretical underpin-
nings of this holding, the Quilloin opinion dwelled particularly on
the facts of the case and dealt with policy considerations only
briefly.99 The precise boundaries of the putative father's parental
rights, although narrowly clarified in Quilloin, remain uncertain.
Undoubtedly, the extent of these parental rights will be the subject
of considerable debate in the near future.100
Donald L. Swanson '80
99. E.g, the Court devoted seven pages to the factual background of the case and
only three pages to the due process and equal protection rationale.
100. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, cert granted, 436 U.S. 903 (1978) (No. 77-6431);
note 53 supra.
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